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Appellants, present and former justices and court 
administrators of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
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appeal from the district court's February 28, 1997 order 
denying their motion to dismiss appellee Rolf Larsen's 
claims against them on qualified immunity grounds. The 
district court had jurisdiction over Larsen's claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 28 U.S.C.S 1343 as 
Larsen states his claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and 42 
U.S.C. S 300bb. Jurisdiction over this appeal from a denial 
of qualified immunity rests on 28 U.S.C. S 1291 pursuant 
to the collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 (1985). For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in 
part the district court's denial of qualified immunity and 
will remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case arises from appellants' June 1994 decision to 
terminate the medical insurance benefits of appellee Rolf 
Larsen, a former justice of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, following his conviction on felony charges in 
the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and his 
suspension from office pursuant to an order of the 
Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline. In November 
1977, Larsen was elected to a ten-year term on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court beginning in January 1978. 
In November 1987, Larsen won a retention election for a 
second ten-year term beginning in January 1988. On 
December 12, 1989, toward the end of Larsen's 12th year 
as a Supreme Court justice, the Supreme Court adopted a 
benefits plan which provided lifetime medical insurance 
benefits for retired judges with ten or more years of judicial 
service, regardless of their age. See app. at 93. 
 
On July 17, 1991, the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry 
Review Board ("JIRB"), following an investigation into 
allegations of misconduct, reported to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court that Larsen had created an appearance of 
impropriety by engaging in ex parte communications with a 
trial judge in a pending case. The JIRB recommended that 
Larsen be reprimanded publicly. See app. at 72. On 
October 14, 1992, the Supreme Court, acting through a 
panel of three justices, adopted the JIRB's recommendation 
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and issued an order publicly reprimanding Larsen. See In 
re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992). Justices Zappala and 
Cappy voted in favor of the order while Justice Papadakos 
dissented. 
 
On November 24, 1992, Larsen filed a petition before the 
Supreme Court seeking the disqualification and recusal of 
Justices Zappala and Cappy on the grounds that these 
justices, together with Chief Justice Nix and other 
individuals, had engaged in various forms of misconduct 
involving ex parte communications, kickbacks, partiality 
toward litigants and interference in pending cases. See app. 
at 72-73; 769. A grand jury then commenced a nine-month 
investigation into Larsen's accusations and on November 5, 
1993, released a report stating that it had found evidence 
of further wrongdoing by Larsen.1 The grand jury reported 
that Larsen had maintained a list of petitions for allowance 
of appeal to be afforded special handling by his staff and 
had obtained prescription tranquilizers for his own use by 
causing a physician to issue prescriptions in the names of 
members of his judicial staff. See app. at 76. 
 
The Attorney General of Pennsylvania, acting on a 
presentment issued by the grand jury on October 22, 1993, 
brought criminal charges against Larsen relating to his 
unlawful acquisition of prescription medications. By order 
dated October 28, 1993, the Supreme Court relieved Larsen 
of all judicial and administrative duties as a justice, but did 
not suspend his pay. See app. at 76. 
 
On November 23, 1993, the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives adopted House Resolution Number 205 
authorizing its judiciary committee to investigate Larsen. 
See app. at 77. That investigation culminated in a writ of 
impeachment summons which eventually resulted in 
Larsen's conviction on October 4, 1994. See app. at 790. 
Larsen has brought claims challenging various aspects of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While the 1992 grand jury reported no evidence to substantiate 
Larsen's accusations against the other justices, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania later found that 
Chief Justice Nix had interfered substantially in a pending criminal case. 
See Yohn v. Love, 887 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff 'd in relevant 
part, 76 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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the impeachment proceedings. Those claims are the subject 
of separate appeals before this court and thus we do not 
address them in this opinion. 
 
On April 9, 1994, after a five-day trial before the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, a jury convicted 
Larsen of two counts of felony conspiracy for unlawful 
procurement of controlled substances. See app. at 77.2 On 
June 3, 1994, the Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline 
suspended Larsen from office without pay based on Article 
V, S 18(d)(2) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which 
authorizes orders "directing the suspension, with or without 
pay, of any justice, judge or justice of the peace .. . against 
whom has been filed an indictment or information charging 
a felony." See In re Larsen, 655 A.2d 239 (Pa. Ct. Judic. 
Disc. 1994). 
 
The Court of Common Pleas sentenced Larsen on June 
13, 1994, and as part of its sentence removed Larsen from 
judicial office pursuant to Article VI, S 7 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, which provides that, "[a]ll civil officers shall 
hold their offices on the condition that they behave 
themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on 
conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous 
crime." See Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania , 646 A.2d 
694, 697 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). 
 
In a letter dated June 17, 1994, David A. Frankforter, 
Human Resources Manager for the Court Administrator of 
Pennsylvania, acting on behalf of Court Administrator 
Nancy Sobolevitch and the justices of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, notified Larsen that he was ineligible to 
receive retirement medical benefits as of June 3, 1994, the 
date of the Court of Judicial Discipline order suspending 
Larsen without pay. See app. at 94. 
 
Until 1993, the Pennsylvania Constitution contained a 
provision mandating that, "[n]o compensation shall be paid 
to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is 
suspended or removed from office. . . ." Pa. Const. art. V, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Larsen contended that the prescription tranquilizers were medically 
necessary and that he had them prescribed in the names of third parties 
to protect his privacy. 
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S 16(b). In a 1992 decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, analyzing the language and history of that provision, 
held that its denial of "compensation" to suspended or 
removed judges did not encompass retirement benefits. 
Thus, the court held that judges who had been removed 
from office for misconduct could not be denied retirement 
benefits based on that provision. See Glancey v. State 
Retirement Bd., 610 A.2d 15, 22-23 (Pa. 1992). 
 
In 1993, section 16 was amended to provide that, 
"[e]xcept as provided by law, no salary, retirement benefit or 
other compensation, present or deferred, shall be paid to 
any justice, judge or justice of the peace who . . . is 
suspended, removed or barred from holding judicial office." 
Pa. Const. art. V, S 16(b). Therefore, in contrast to the prior 
version of section 16(b) which addressed only 
"compensation," the 1993 version explicitly encompassed 
retirement benefits and other forms of deferred 
compensation and provided for the denial of such benefits 
upon removal. 
 
Larsen commenced this action on September 13, 1995, 
by filing a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 
which, insofar as material to this opinion, alleged that 
appellants' June 17, 1994 decision to terminate his medical 
benefits violated his rights under the Impairment of 
Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, S 10, the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1, 
the First Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. I, and the Public 
Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 300bb-1 et seq. 
Appellants moved to dismiss Larsen's claims on the 
grounds that his complaint failed to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted and that his claims were barred by 
the doctrine of qualified immunity. In an opinion and order 
dated February 28, 1997, the district court denied 
appellants' assertion of qualified immunity. See Larsen v. 
Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 955 F. Supp. 
1549, 1580 n.31 (M.D. Pa. 1997). Appellants filed a timely 
notice of appeal on March 27, 1997.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. By orders dated June 18, 1997, and September 30, 1997, this appeal 
was consolidated with, respectively, the appeals in numbers 97-7296 
and 97-7451 which concern Larsen's challenge to his impeachment. This 
opinion, however, concerns only the appeal in number 97-7153. 
 




A. Clearly Established Rights 
 
Initially we set forth the framework for our analysis. In 
Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 
(1991), the Supreme Court explained that when a qualified 
immunity defense is raised a court first should determine 
whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a 
constitutional right at all. Only if that question is answered 
affirmatively need the court determine whether the 
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds 
that his conduct did "not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). The Court recently 
reaffirmed this principle in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n.5 (1998). In this case we largely 
focus on the second question because we are satisfied that 
except with respect to the equal protection of the law and 
the Public Health Services Act claims Larsen adequately 
asserted a violation of his constitutional rights. 
 
In considering the second question we recognize that 
qualified immunity is from suit as well as from liability, so 
that "[u]nless the plaintiff 's allegations state a claim of 
violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading 
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the 
commencement of discovery." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 
S.Ct. at 2815. For purposes of this appeal from the district 
court's denial of qualified immunity based upon the 
pleadings, we must accept Larsen's allegations as true and 
afford him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Nami 
v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). Appellants' 
entitlement to qualified immunity under these standards is 
a question of law subject to plenary review. See Pro v. 
Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1996); Giuffre v. 
Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1247 (3d Cir. 1994). 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court addressed the qualified immunity issue as follows: 
 
       [appellants'] arguments in support of qualified immunity are 
limited 
       to the same arguments they assert in support of the outright 
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A right is "clearly established" for qualified immunity 
purposes only if "[t]he contours of the right" are "sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what 
he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982). Thus, 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if"reasonable 
officials in [their] position at the relevant time could have 
believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that 
their conduct would be lawful." In re City of Philadelphia 
Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 961 n.14 (3d Cir. 1995). Even where 
officials "clearly should have been aware of the governing 
legal principles, they are nevertheless entitled to immunity 
if based on the information available to them they could 
have believed their conduct would be consistent with those 
principles." Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 620 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 
 
However, for reasonable officials to be on notice that their 
conduct would be unlawful, there need not be "a previous 
precedent directly on point." Acierno, 40 F.3d at 620; accord 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3039 (holding that 
the "clearly established" standard does not require that "the 
very action in question has previously been held unlawful"). 
Rather, there need only be "some but not precise factual 
correspondence between relevant precedents and the 
conduct at issue," Pro, 81 F.3d at 1292 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted), so that "in the light of 
pre-existing law the unlawfulness [would be] apparent." 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. We must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       dismissal of Larsen's claims. As the court has determined that 
these 
       arguments provide no basis upon which to dismiss Larsen's . . . 
       claims, they also provide no basis upon which to afford 
[appellants] 
       immunity from suit in their personal capacities. 
 
Larsen, 955 F. Supp. at 1580 n.31. Thus the court did not distinguish 
the issue of whether the complaint alleged viable claims for purposes of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) from the issue of whether it 
alleged violations of clearly established rights within the meaning of the 
qualified immunity doctrine. Our analysis largely turns on a de novo 
inquiry as to the latter issue, see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 
at 
2815, as we are satisfied that for the most part Larsen adequately has 
asserted a violation of his constitutional rights. 
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determine, in light of these principles, whether Larsen 
alleges violations of clearly established rights. 5 
 
B. Impairment of Contracts Clause 
 
Appellants contend that the district court erred in 
denying them qualified immunity as to Larsen's claim that 
termination of his benefits violated his rights under the 
Impairment of Contracts Clause, which provides that"[n]o 
state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, S 10. According to 
appellants, Larsen's right to receive those benefits following 
his removal from office was not clearly established, since 
reasonable officials could have believed either that Larsen 
was not eligible for benefits under the terms of the benefits 
plan, or that Larsen, even if otherwise eligible for benefits, 
lawfully could be denied those benefits pursuant to the 
1993 version of Article V, section 16, of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution which precludes payment of benefits to 
justices who have been removed from office. 
 
1. Eligibility Under the Retirement Benefits Pla n 
 
Appellants contend that Larsen fails to allege a clearly 
established right to receive retirement medical benefits 
because, according to his complaint, the plan conferring 
the right to those benefits applied only to "retired" members 
of the judiciary. Thus, appellants argue, a reasonable 
official "would have been justified in concluding that Larsen 
was not covered" by the terms of the benefits plan since he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Larsen, br. at 14, contends that the doctrine of qualified immunity is 
inapplicable because appellants' revocation of his medical benefits 
involved "a ministerial, non-discretionary act." See People of Three Mile 
Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1984). 
We disagree. As the Supreme Court recognized in Davis v. Scherer, 468 
U.S. 183, 195 n.14, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3020 n.14 (1984), officials must 
make discretionary determinations even in the course of applying facially 
clear provisions. Because appellants' decision to deny Larsen's benefits 
required such discretionary determinations, including legal analysis as 
to the applicability of the 1993 version of section 16(b), it cannot be 
characterized as a ministerial act outside the scope of the qualified 
immunity doctrine. 
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had been removed from office and had not "retired" 
voluntarily. Br. at 12. We disagree. As of the time 
appellants decided to deny Larsen's benefits, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that judicial officers 
who had been removed from office for misconduct were 
entitled to receive benefits under a plan which by its terms 
applied to "retired" judicial officers. In upholding removed 
judges' right to receive "retirement" benefits, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not find it significant that 
those judges had not "retired" voluntarily from office. 
Rather, the court treated them as fully eligible under the 
retirement plan and proceeded to analyze whether a 
separate provision of law precluded them from receiving 
those benefits to which they were entitled under the plan. 
See Glancey, 610 A.2d at 22-23.6  The decision in Glancey 
forecloses appellants' argument that officials charged with 
administering a retirement benefits plan reasonably could 
construe the terms of that plan narrowly to exclude 
removed judges from coverage when the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had included such individuals in the terms 
of eligibility.7 
 
In light of this case law including individuals such as 
Larsen within the terms of eligibility for retirement benefits, 
and in the absence of any authority for excluding 
individuals from eligibility under a retirement plan on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Glancey resolved the cases of several different judges, some of whom 
were removed while still in office and others of whom were not issued 
removal orders until after they had resigned or retired. The court treated 
those judges identically in terms of their eligibility for benefits under 
the 
retirement plan. See 610 A.2d at 22-23. 
 
7. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had reached similar results in cases 
involving "retirement" plans for elected officials and public employees, 
upholding the eligibility under such plans of individuals who did not 
retire voluntarily. See Bellomini v. State Retirement Bd., 445 A.2d 737, 
741 (Pa. 1982) (holding that legislators who resigned under pressure at 
about the time of their criminal convictions were entitled to "retirement" 
benefits); Harvey v. Retirement Bd. of Allegheny County, 141 A.2d 197, 
203 (Pa. 1958) (holding that public employee who had been dismissed for 
cause was entitled to "retirement" benefits); Wright v. Retirement Bd. of 
Allegheny County, 134 A.2d 231, 233-34 (Pa. 1957) (holding that public 
employee who had been separated involuntarily from employment was 
entitled to "retirement" benefits). 
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grounds that they were involuntarily removed from office, 
we find that it was clearly established that Larsen could not 
be disqualified from receiving benefits under the terms of 
the benefits plan. Accordingly, we must consider whether 
appellants are entitled to qualified immunity on the 
grounds that they reasonably could have believed that 
Article V, section 16, as amended in 1993, operated to 
divest Larsen of benefits which he otherwise would have 
been eligible to receive. 
 
2. Divestiture of Benefits Pursuant to Section 1 6 
 
Appellants contend that they are entitled to qualified 
immunity because a reasonable official could have believed 
that their revocation of Larsen's benefits was lawful 
pursuant to the 1993 version of section 16, which provides 
that judges who are suspended or removed from office shall 
not receive any "salary, retirement benefit or other 
compensation, present or deferred." Pa. Const. art. V, 
S 16(b). Larsen, however, contends that the application of 
that provision violated his clearly established rights, as it 
was adopted after his right to retirement benefits had 
vested in 1989, at which time he had completed ten years 
of service and thus had satisfied all requirements necessary 
to receive full retirement benefits.8  Larsen emphasizes that 
the version of section 16 in effect at the time his rights 
vested did not revoke retirement benefits upon removal 
from office. See Glancey, 610 A.2d at 22-23. Thus, Larsen 
argues that the 1993 amendment to that provision 
unilaterally altered the terms of his employment 
compensation, retroactively depriving him of contractual 
rights which had vested before the amendment and 
violating his right against impairment of contractual 
obligations. See br. at 19. 
 




8. Vesting occurs when an individual "has completed the number of 
years of service required for eligibility" to receive benefits under the 
terms of a retirement plan. Police Pension Fund Ass'n Bd. v. Hess, 562 
A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). 
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       [i]t has long been recognized in Pennsylvania that the 
       nature of retirement provisions for public employees is 
       that of deferred compensation for service actually 
       rendered in the past. And it is the law of this 
       Commonwealth that unilateral modifications . . . after 
       retirement eligibility requirements have been met, may 
       not be adverse to the [employee]. 
 
Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Officers & Employees 
Retirement Bd., 461 A.2d 593, 595 (Pa. 1983) (citations 
omitted). In Zimmerman, the Commonwealth sought to 
terminate a public official's retirement benefits based on a 
statute providing for forfeiture of the right to such benefits 
upon conviction of a crime related to public office. The 
court, finding that the official's vested right to retirement 
benefits had accrued before enactment of the statute, held 
that that right "cannot be reached by a retroactive forfeiture 
provision," and thus upheld the official's right to receive 
retirement benefits despite his conviction for crimes that 
warranted forfeiture under the statute. See id.  at 598. 
 
In reaffirming its decision on reargument, the court 
reiterated that, "[i]t is [the] attempt to divest previously 
vested rights of a public . . . official by subsequent 
legislative judgment that we find to be a constitutionally 
impermissible retroactive divestment of vested rights." 
Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Officers & Employees 
Retirement Bd., 469 A.2d 141, 142 (Pa. 1983) (per curiam). 
Justice Zappala, one of four justices who joined in the 
majority opinion, wrote separately "to emphasize that no 
law, regardless of how noble its purpose may retroactively 
affect existing contract obligations. U.S. Const. art. 1 S 10. 
cl. 1. . . . Once a contractual obligation vests . .. the same 
cannot be altered, amended or changed by unilateral 
action." 469 A.2d at 144 (Zappala, J., concurring). We find 
that these precedents analyzing an impairment of contract 
claim under circumstances closely analogous to those in 
the present case clearly establish that retirement benefits 
could not lawfully be denied based upon a provision 
adopted after the right to receive those benefits had vested.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Because Larsen's right to retirement benefits had vested before 
adoption of the 1993 constitutional amendment, we need address only 
the implications of applying that amendment retroactively to previously 
vested rights. Accordingly, our opinion has no application to individuals 
whose rights vested after 1993. 
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Appellants contend that Zimmerman is distinguishable 
because the official in that case had begun receiving 
benefits before the Commonwealth sought to terminate 
them. However, Zimmerman expressly noted that the court's 
prior decisions had established that a subsequently 
adopted provision "could not prevent the payment of 
benefits to employees whose . . . rights were vested in 
enjoyment" before passage of the provision. See id. at 143 
(citing Bellomini v. State Employees' Retirement Bd., 445 
A.2d 737 (Pa. 1982)). The court then held that the same 
principle applied where the official's "right in the terms of 
entitlement, although not enjoyment, had vested" before 
passage of the benefits forfeiture provision. Id. Thus, 
Zimmerman establishes that the dispositive time after which 
an employee's right to benefits cannot be altered is the time 
of the vesting of those rights "in the terms of entitlement." 
In this case, Larsen's right to retirement benefits vested in 
terms of entitlement in 1989, at which time he had satisfied 
all conditions necessary to receive full retirement benefits, 
and under the law that existed at that time, those benefits 
could not be terminated upon removal from office. See 
Glancey, 610 A.2d 15. Accordingly, it was clearly 
established that Larsen could not be denied benefits based 
upon a provision adopted in 1993.10 
 
Numerous other Pennsylvania cases have reached the 
same result precluding infringements on previously vested 
rights based on rules that did not exist at the time of 
vesting. In Association of Pennsylvania State College & Univ. 
Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 479 A.2d 962, 965 
(Pa. 1984), the court, applying both the federal and state 
Impairment of Contracts Clauses, held that the 
"constitutional infirmity" of an adverse amendment of 
previously existing rules "with respect to [employees] whose 
entitlement to retirement benefits had already vested is 
clear." Thus, the court held that the amendment was "void 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Zimmerman, in dictum, distinguished the situation before it from a 
situation where a removal due to misconduct would result in the 
official's "failure . . . to complete the term of eligibility." See 469 
A.2d at 
143. This dictum does not apply to Larsen, who had satisfied the term 
of eligibility before he was removed from office and before the benefits 
forfeiture provision was adopted. 
 
                                14 
  
as applied to employees whose rights were vested prior to 
its enactment." Id.; accord Burello v. State Employes' 
Retirement Sys., 411 A.2d 852, 855 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) 
(citations omitted) ("[W]hen the conditions of retirement 
eligibility have been satisfied, retirement pay has ripened 
into a full contractual obligation and become a vested right 
[which] cannot be disturbed by subsequent legislation."); 
Harvey v. Allegheny County Retirement Bd., 141 A.2d 197, 
203 (Pa. 1958) (holding that employee who had "complied 
with all conditions necessary" to receive benefits "cannot be 
affected adversely by subsequent legislation which changes 
the terms of the retirement contract"); Wright v. Allegheny 
County Retirement Bd., 134 A.2d 231, 233-34 (Pa. 1957) 
(holding that a provision which was adopted after an 
employee's rights had vested but before employee retired 
could not lawfully be applied, as the employee's rights were 
"vested and unqualified" under the previously existing law 




11. The Pennsylvania Impairment of Contracts Clause provides that, 
"[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . shall be 
passed." 
Pa. Const. art. I, S 17. Because the Pennsylvania cases discussed above 
apply the federal Impairment of Contracts Clause, see, e.g., Association 
of Pennsylvania State College & Univ. Faculties, 479 A.2d at 964; 
Zimmerman, 469 A.2d at 144 (Zappala, J., concurring); Burello, 411 A.2d 
at 855, they clearly establish Larsen's rights under federal law, 
particularly absent any federal precedent to the contrary. See Mississippi 
v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174, 179, 48 S.Ct. 266, 268 (1928) (holding that 
"retroactive application" of a law adopted"after services have been 
rendered" would deprive employee of an amount"he had theretofore 
earned" and thus "would impair the obligation of the . . . contract" that 
existed at the time service was rendered). In Dodge v. Board of Educ. of 
Chicago, 302 U.S. 74, 77-78, 58 S.Ct. 98, 99-100 (1937), the Court 
permitted an impairment of retirement benefits, but did so on the 
grounds that state law rendered those benefits"mere gratuities" that did 
not give rise to vested contractual rights. Thus, Dodge is inapposite in 
this case where the benefits are a form of deferred compensation to 
which employees have enforceable contractual rights, see Zimmerman, 
469 A.2d at 142 ("[W]e have rejected the view that pension benefits are 
mere gratuities . . . . [I]t is the well settled law of this jurisdiction 
that 
the nature of retirement provisions . . . is that of deferred compensation 
for services actually rendered in the past.") (citations omitted), and 
does 
not alter the fact that nothing in the federal precedents blurs the 
clearly 
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Appellants, br. at 12-13, argue that despite these cases 
clearly holding that retroactive denials of previously vested 
rights to retirement benefits unconstitutionally impair a 
contractual obligation to pay those benefits, the contours of 
Larsen's rights were not clearly established because cases 
analyzing impairments of contract have held that afinding 
of a "technical impairment is merely a preliminary step in 
resolving the more difficult question of whether that 
impairment is permitted under the Constitution," United 
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21, 97 S.Ct. 
1505, 1517 (1976) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted), and therefore have analyzed the nature, purpose, 
and extent of the impairment in light of the public interests 
at stake. See Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court 
Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 771 (2d Cir. 1991). 
We find this argument unpersuasive. As of the time of 
appellants' decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
considered and rejected the argument that public interests 
in sanctioning official misconduct warranted retroactive 
impairment of vested rights. The court held that,"any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
established contours of the rights under the federal Impairment of 
Contracts Clause which are set forth in the Pennsylvania cases. 
 
In this case the provision adopted after vesting was set forth in the 
state constitution whereas in the cases discussed above, the provisions 
purporting to infringe the right to benefits were adopted by statute or 
ordinance. However, it was clearly established that,"[a] state can no 
more pass a law violating the obligation of a contract by means of a 
convention than by its legislature, so a provision in a state constitution 
which prohibits the enforcement of a contract is void." Fisk v. Police 
Jury 
of Jefferson, 116 U.S. 131, 135, 6 S.Ct. 329, 331 (1885) (citations 
omitted); accord McBride v. Retirement Bd. of Allegheny County, 199 A. 
130, 132-33 (Pa. 1938) ("the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution 
. . . forbids impairment by the states, not only by statute, but also by 
amendment to . . . the State Constitution") (citations omitted). Moreover, 
nothing in the cases addressing retroactive statutory impairments of 
vested rights suggests that their holdings turn on the source of the 
retroactive law. Thus, the contours of the right against retroactive 
impairment were clearly established when appellants terminated 
Larsen's benefits despite the lack of "precise factual correspondence" 
between this case and those where the subsequently enacted provision 
was statutory. See Pro, 81 F.3d at 1292. 
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argument predicated upon a compelling state interest must 
necessarily fail when applied to this attempted retroactive 
forfeiture" of previously vested retirement benefits. See 
Zimmerman, 461 A.2d at 598.12 Thus, officials charged with 
administering a retirement benefits plan could not 
reasonably have believed, in light of the decided cases 
construing the scope of the Impairment of Contracts 
Clause, that the balance of interests rendered the 
impairment of Larsen's rights lawful. 
 
Based on the cases discussed above, we find that Larsen, 
by alleging that he was deprived of previously vested rights 
pursuant to a provision adopted after vesting, has alleged a 
violation of clearly established rights under the Impairment 
of Contracts Clause of which reasonable officials charged 
with administering retirement benefits would have known.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The court explained that benefit forfeiture provisions are powerless 
to 
deter official misconduct that occurred before their enactment. See 461 
A.2d at 598. The misconduct leading to Larsen's removal occurred well 
before the 1993 adoption of the amended section 16, bringing this case 
squarely within the rationale of Zimmerman's holding that the public 
interest in enforcing benefit forfeiture provisions did not outweigh the 
constitutional interests in protecting vested contractual rights to 
retirement benefits against retroactive impairment. 
 
13. Appellants also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity 
because it was not clearly established that retirement medical benefits 
were to be treated in the same manner as other forms of retirement 
benefits. See br. at 11-12. We reject this contention. It was clearly 
established that "the nature of retirement provisions . . . is that of 
deferred compensation for services actually rendered in the past." 
Zimmerman, 469 A.2d at 142-43 (citations omitted). Retirement medical 
benefits, like other retirement benefits, are an item of economic value 
offered in return for work performed, and thus fall squarely within the 
principles set forth in the cases discussed above. Indeed, to accept 
appellants' argument we would have to close our eyes to what we know 
in this era of high medical costs, that medical benefits are of crucial 
importance to retired employees. Moreover, while the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had not applied this rule in the precise context of 
medical benefits, it had indicated in dictum that it would do so. See, 
e.g., 
In re Upper Providence Police Delaware County Lodge No. 27, 526 A.2d 
315, 322 n.6 (Pa. 1987) (citing deferred compensation cases for the 
proposition that denial of medical benefits would"pose serious 
constitutional problems"); Lower Merion Fraternal Order of Police Lodge v. 
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We hold, therefore, that appellants are not entitled to 
qualified immunity as to Larsen's claim that their 
termination of his medical benefits unconstitutionally 
 
impaired his contractual right to those benefits. 
 
C. Due Process 
 
The Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o state shall 
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,S 1. Larsen 
claims that appellants violated his due process rights by 
terminating his medical benefits as they did so without 
providing him notice and either a pre- or post- revocation 
hearing. Br. at 22. Appellants answer that, because Larsen 
had no clearly established property interest in medical 
benefits for retired members of the judiciary, their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lower Merion Township, 512 A.2d 612, 619 (Pa. 1986) (noting that three 
justices of equally divided court would treat medical benefits like any 
other form of deferred compensation while three justices would resolve 
case on grounds that did not implicate the issue). Thus, despite the lack 
of a precedent "directly on point," the law was sufficiently clearly 
established that a reasonable official would have known that an action 
that was unlawful as to other forms of retirement benefits also would be 
unlawful as to retirement medical benefits. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 620. 
 
In holding that retroactive application of a provision adopted after 
vesting violates rights of which a reasonable official charged with 
administering retirement benefits would have known, we recognize that 
Larsen alleges that both Supreme Court justices and court 
administrators participated in the decision to deny his benefits. 
Although, under certain circumstances, a reasonable judicial officer 
might be held to more stringent standards than a reasonable court 
administrator, the cases proscribing retroactive divestment of vested 
rights are sufficiently clear that any reasonable official, whether 
judicial 
or administrative, charged with administering a retirement benefits 
program should have known of this proscription. We also recognize that 
the judicial officers and court administrators may have played different 
roles in the decision to deny Larsen's benefits. However, at this 
juncture, 
the pleadings do not elucidate the nature of each appellant's 
participation in the challenged decision. Accordingly, we address only the 
principles of law of which reasonable officials in any of the appellants' 
positions should have known in participating in a decision to deny 
vested benefits. 
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cancellation of Larsen's benefits did not violate clearly 
established rights under the Due Process Clause of which 
a reasonable official would have known. Appellants, 
however, do not deny that if Larsen had a property interest 
in his medical benefits he was entitled to some sort of 
hearing with respect to their termination. See, e.g., 
McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 453-61 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
For the purposes of the Due Process Clause, property 
interests are defined by state law. See Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972); 
Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1077 (3d Cir. 
1997). Larsen contends that he had a clearly established 
property right to the benefits associated with his office, 
since he had a contractual right to those benefits, and it 
was "clearly established that contractual rights are property 
interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Br. at 22. We find merit in this argument 
because it is clear that a contract right is a "form of 
property." United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19 n.16, 97 
S.Ct. at 1516 n.16. Thus, inasmuch as "in Pennsylvania 
. . . the nature of retirement provisions for public employees 
is that of deferred compensation for services actually 
rendered in the past," Zimmerman, 461 A.2d 597, Larsen 
had a property interest in his right to medical benefits that 
was sufficiently clear that appellants should have 
understood that the termination of those benefits triggered 
Larsen's right under the Due Process Clause to an 
opportunity to be heard regarding his claim of entitlement 




14. Appellants contend that since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
held that elected public officials have no constitutionally protected 
property interest in their elected public office, see In re 1991 
Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 609 A.2d 132 (Pa. 
1992), it was reasonable for them to infer that there was no 
constitutionally protected right to the benefits associated with that 
public office. Br. at 15. We disagree. A holding than an elected official 
does not have a property right in his office is completely distinguishable 
from the situation at hand which involves deferred compensation for 
services rendered. 
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Appellants contend that even if Larsen had a clearly 
established property interest in his medical benefits "a 
reasonable state official would be justified in concluding 
that Larsen received all the process to which he was 
entitled before the cancellation of his health care benefits." 
Br. at 15-16. Specifically, appellants argue that Larsen had 
ample opportunity to challenge his impeachment in the 
Senate, his criminal conviction in the state courts, and his 
suspension by the Court of Judicial Discipline. Id. at 15. 
We reject this argument because, while these proceedings 
allowed Larsen to contest the basis for his suspension and 
removal from office, none of them afforded him an 
opportunity to address the distinct issue of whether 
medical benefits lawfully could be terminated as a result of 
that suspension and removal. Since Larsen was not 
afforded an opportunity to be heard regarding the propriety 
of terminating his medical benefits, reasonable officials 
could not have believed that Larsen received the process he 
was due in connection with a deprivation of a clearly 
established property right. Accordingly, appellants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Larsen's due 
process claim.15 
 
D. Equal Protection 
 
Appellants contend that they are entitled to qualified 
immunity as to Larsen's claim that the denial of his medical 
benefits violated his rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause, which provides that "[n]o state shall. . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1. We agree. Larsen 
asserts that he was denied equal protection of the law 
because he was denied retirement benefits following his 
removal from office, whereas judges who had been removed 
for misconduct in the past had received such benefits 
notwithstanding their removal. Since Larsen does not allege 
that appellants violated a fundamental right or relied on a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We do not find it necessary to address the question of what 
opportunity to be heard should have been afforded Larsen as appellants 
offered him no such opportunity at all either before or after 
Frankforter's 
June 17, 1994 letter. 
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suspect or quasi-suspect classification, their actions, in 
order to comport with the Equal Protection Clause, need 
have only a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest. See Tolchin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 111 
F.3d 1099, 1113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 435 
(1997); Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1993).16 
 
According to appellants, reasonable officials could believe 
that they had a rational basis for treating Larsen differently 
from judges removed in the past, since there had been an 
intervening constitutional amendment which served the 
rational and legitimate objective of preventing"officials who 
have been removed from office for breaching the public's 
trust from benefitting from the . . . public purse." Br. at 17. 
We agree and in fact are satisfied that Larsen's equal 
protection claim does not adequately allege a violation of a 
constitutional right at all and thus does not satisfy the first 
prong of the Siegert test. See 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. at 
1793. The Equal Protection Clause does not require 
identical treatment of all individuals, but rather permits 
differential treatment of individuals who are differently 
situated in some relevant respect. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331 (1992). Thus, 
individuals who are differently situated in terms of their 
"legitimate expectation and reliance interests" rationally 
may be subjected to different rules designed to afford 
greater protection to those with heightened legitimate 
expectations. Id. at 13 (citations omitted) (upholding 
imposition of greater tax burden on those who acquired 
property after change in tax law based on their lesser 
expectation interests as compared to those who owned 
property before change in law). Because Larsen was 
removed from office at a time when the Pennsylvania 
Constitution provided for denial of benefits upon removal, 
his position was different from that of judges who were 
removed when no such provision existed.17  Accordingly, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Suspect classifications involve traits such as race, national origin, 
or 
alienage, while quasi-suspect classifications involve traits such as 
gender. See Dyszel, 6 F.3d 125 n.13. 
 
17. The difference in the law at the time of removal creates a distinction 
which a reasonable official could believe was a rational basis, under the 
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there was a rational basis for treating Larsen differently 
from judges removed from office before the 1993 
constitutional amendment, and appellants are entitled to 
dismissal of Larsen's equal protection claim. 
 
E. First Amendment 
 
Larsen contends that appellants' revocation of his 
benefits violated his right of free speech under the First 
Amendment because it was a form of retaliation for his 
protected speech in alleging misconduct on the part of his 
fellow Supreme Court justices. To state a claim for 
actionable retaliation under the First Amendment, the 
plaintiff must allege facts which, if proven, would establish 
that the plaintiff 's protected First Amendment activity was 
a "substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory 
action." Feldman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. , 43 F.3d 823, 
829 (3d Cir. 1994). This rule is derived from the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576 
(1977). 
 
In support of their assertion that they are entitled to 
qualified immunity as to Larsen's First Amendment claim, 
appellants contend, br. at 18-19, that they could have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Equal Protection Clause, for treating Larsen differently from the judges 
removed before 1993, thus entitling appellants to qualified immunity 
under the second prong of the Siegert analysis even if Larsen's 
allegations satisfied the first prong. While a reasonable official could 
believe that the 1993 constitutional amendment created a distinction 
between different judges depending on their status at the time of its 
adoption, which provided a "rational basis" for differential treatment 
within the meaning of the equal protection jurisprudence, as discussed 
in Part III. B 2, supra, a reasonable official could not believe that the 
1993 amendment may be applied retroactively to deny previously vested 
rights, as the impairment of contracts jurisprudence clearly proscribes 
such retroactive impairments. Because of the divergent standards under 
these distinct constitutional provisions, we find that reasonable 
officials 
could believe that the decision to deny Larsen's benefits did not violate 
clearly established equal protection principles but could not believe that 
this decision did not violate clearly established impairment of contracts 
principles. 
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believed that their decision to revoke Larsen's benefits was 
not unconstitutionally retaliatory because they could have 
believed that they were required to apply the 1993 version 
of section 16, and thus that they would not be liable under 
the First Amendment as they would have reached the same 
decision " `even in the absence of the protected conduct.' " 
Givhan v. Eastern Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 
416, 99 S.Ct. 693, 697 (1979) (quoting Mount Healthy v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576). Appellants' 
argument requires the court to apply the objective 
reasonableness standards of the qualified immunity 
doctrine to the subjective element of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, and thus calls for the somewhat illogical 
inquiry into "whether a person reasonably could have 
thought that he in fact thought something." Sheppard v. 
Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
The qualified immunity analysis requires a determination 
as to whether reasonable officials could believe that their 
conduct was not unlawful even if it was in fact unlawful. 
See In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d at 961 n.14. In 
the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim, that 
determination turns on an inquiry into whether officials 
reasonably could believe that their motivations were proper 
even when their motivations were in fact retaliatory. Even 
assuming that this could be demonstrated under a certain 
set of facts, it is an inquiry that cannot be conducted 
without factual determinations as to the officials' subjective 
beliefs and motivations, and thus cannot properly be 
resolved on the face of the pleadings, but rather can be 
resolved only after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to 
adduce evidence in support of the allegations that the true 
motive for the conduct was retaliation rather than the 
legitimate reason proffered by the defendants. See 
Sheppard, 94 F.3d at 828-29.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In this respect the qualified immunity analysis as to a First 
Amendment retaliation claim differs from the qualified immunity analysis 
as to claims under the Impairment of Contracts or Due Process Clause, 
which requires only an objective analysis of whether reasonable officials 
could believe that the challenged actions conformed to objective 
standards of conduct. 
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According to Larsen's allegations, which we must accept 
as true for purposes of this appeal from an order entered 
on the pleadings, the true motive for appellants' decision 
was retaliation for his protected speech. See  app. at 72-73; 
96-97. Appellants may be able to establish by the end of 
discovery that their decision in fact rested on a good faith 
belief, which they would have formed even in the absence 
of any protected speech, that they were to required to 
revoke Larsen's benefits under the 1993 version of section 
16. However, at this juncture, we must accept Larsen's 
allegations that their true reasons were retaliatory, 
allegations which state a claim for violation of clearly 
established rights under the First Amendment, precluding 
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. See Walker v. 
Schwalbe, 112 F.3d 1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
assertion of qualified immunity on grounds that defendants' 
proffer of non-retaliatory reason created factual dispute as 
to "true reason" for the adverse action and did not defeat 
claim for violation of clearly established right against 
retaliatory action); see also Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 
110 F.3d 968, 981 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that assertion of 
non-retaliatory reason which would have justified decision 
even in absence of protected activity created factual issue 
precluding summary judgment as to retaliation claim). 
 
In reaching this result we are not suggesting that a bare 
allegation of retaliatory motive necessarily is sufficient to 
defeat an assertion of qualified immunity as to a retaliation 
claim. In some circumstances, the legitimate basis for the 
actions might be so apparent that the plaintiff 's allegations 
of retaliatory motive could not alter the conclusion that 
under the circumstances alleged in the pleadings, the 
defendants would have been compelled to reach the same 
decision even without regard for the protected First 
Amendment activity. In this case, however, appellants were 
faced with a decision as to whether to subject Larsen to the 
more adverse 1993 version of section 16, a decision whose 
outcome, under the circumstances alleged by Larsen, could 
have been affected by a retaliatory motive.19 Thus we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. To defeat a First Amendment retaliation claim if a plaintiff 
demonstrates that his protected First Amendment activity was a 
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cannot conclude from the face of the pleadings that 
appellants would have taken the same action in the 
absence of protected speech. Accordingly, appellants are 
not entitled, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, to 
qualified immunity as to Larsen's First Amendment 
retaliation claim. 
 
F. Public Health Services Act 
 
Appellants contend that they are entitled to qualified 
immunity as to Larsen's claim that the termination of his 
benefits violated his rights under the Public Health Services 
Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 300bb-1 et seq. ("PHSA"). The PHSA 
provides that state-operated group health plans must offer 
18 months of continuing coverage to qualified beneficiaries 
who otherwise would lose coverage as a result of a 
"qualifying event." 42 U.S.C. SS 300bb-1(a), 300bb-2(2). The 
PHSA defines the term "qualifying event" to include 
"termination (other than by reason of [the] employee's gross 
misconduct)." Section 300bb-3(2). 
 
Appellants contend that Larsen did not have a clearly 
established right to continuing coverage under the PHSA, 
because reasonable officials could believe that Larsen's 
termination was not a "qualifying event" within the meaning 
of the PHSA entitling him to elect continuing coverage. 
According to appellants, reasonable officials could conclude 
that Larsen's termination was "by reason of . . . gross 
misconduct," thus excluding his termination from the 
definition of a "qualifying event" under section 300bb-3(2), 
and rendering him ineligible for coverage under section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
substantial or motivating factor for the retaliatory action, a defendant 
must establish not merely that he "could properly" have taken the same 
adverse action based on an independent "legally sufficient" reason, but 
also that he "would have" done so in the absence of protected conduct. 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1075 (3d Cir. 1990). 
The mere fact that the 1993 version of section 16 provided for 
termination of benefits upon removal would not defeat Larsen's 
retaliation claim if he could demonstrate that appellants decided to apply 
that provision, rather than the more lenient version of section 16 that 
existed at the time of vesting, due to retaliatory animus. 
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300bb-1(a). In support of their argument that Larsen's 
termination reasonably could be viewed as a termination 
"by reason of . . . gross misconduct," appellants emphasize 
that Larsen had been convicted of two felony counts, 
removed from office by the Court of Common Pleas as part 
of his criminal sentence, suspended from office by the 
Court of Judicial Discipline for his criminal conduct which 
that court found had undermined public confidence in the 
judiciary, and called before the Senate on a writ of 
impeachment summons. Br. at 20-21. 
 
Neither the PHSA, nor the comparable statute applicable 
to private employers, defines the term "gross misconduct." 
See 42 U.S.C. SS 300bb-1 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. SS 1161 et seq.20 
Moreover, as of the time appellants decided to terminate 
Larsen's benefits, the cases construing these provisions had 
not set forth a clear definition of "gross misconduct" under 
the PHSA.21 These cases, however, had applied the 
standard to conduct which reasonable officials could believe 
was no more egregious than Larsen's conduct in unlawfully 
procuring controlled substances through the use of his 
subordinates. See, e.g., Burke v. American Stores Employee 
Benefit Plan, 818 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding 
that use of improperly procured promotional discount 
vouchers to obtain free products from employer's retail 
outlets constituted gross misconduct); Adkins v. United Int'l 
Investigative Servs., Inc., 1993 WL 345186 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 
(holding that leaving post unattended and falsifying records 
to receive additional paychecks constituted gross 
misconduct); Conery v. Bath Assocs., 803 F. Supp. 1388, 
1396 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that misappropriation of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The analogous provision governing private employers is set forth in 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), 29 
U.S.C. S 1161(a), which requires the employer to offer continuing 
coverage to employees who otherwise "would lose coverage under the 
plan as a result of a qualifying event." 
 
21. In Burke v. American Stores Employee Benefit Plan, 818 F. Supp. 
1131, 1135 (N.D. Ill. 1993), the court, applying 29 U.S.C. S 1161(a), 
noted that, "[t]here is little direct statutory or judicial guidance on 
the 
meaning of `gross misconduct.' " While the Burke court looked to Illinois 
state law for guidance, we have not made any comparable state-law 
analysis. 
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funds constituted gross misconduct). We are satisfied from 
these cases and from the language of the PHSA that Larsen 
has not adequately alleged a violation of the PHSA and thus 
his complaint with respect to that statute does not pass 
muster under the first prong of a Siegert analysis. 
Moreover, even if it did, because a reasonable official could 
believe that the acts which resulted in Larsen's termination 
amounted to gross misconduct, it was not clearly 
established that Larsen's termination was a "qualifying 
event" triggering his right to coverage under the PHSA. 
 
Larsen contends that, regardless of the egregiousness of 
his conduct, it cannot be characterized as "gross 
misconduct" under the PHSA because it did not occur 
"within the scope of his employment as an associate 
justice." Br. at 26-27. However, nothing in the statutory 
language or relevant case law clearly establishes, or even 
suggests, that "gross misconduct" under the PHSA must 
occur within the scope of employment. Accordingly, it 
appears that a reasonable official applying the plain 
language of the PHSA could conclude that any termination 
which occurred "by reason of [the] employee's gross 
misconduct" would fall within the exception to section 
300bb-3(2) and thus would not constitute a "qualifying 
event" entitling the employee to continuing coverage, 
regardless of whether the conduct occurred within the 
scope of employment.22 Because Larsen did not adequately 
allege a violation of the PHSA and because, therefore, there 
was no clearly established law indicating that Larsen's 
termination was a qualifying event under section 300bb- 
3(2), appellants are entitled to qualified immunity as to 
Larsen's claim under the PHSA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Even if it were clearly established that"gross misconduct" 
encompassed only misconduct within the scope of employment, a 
reasonable official could believe that Larsen's conduct was sufficiently 
related to his employment to satisfy such a requirement. As the district 
court noted, 955 F. Supp. at 1581 & n.33, the criminal misconduct 
which led to Larsen's removal from office involved Larsen's use of his 
subordinates and his state employees' prescription plan to procure 
prescription medications unlawfully. Absent some authority to the 
contrary, reasonable officials could conclude that this nexus between 
Larsen's misconduct and his employment would satisfy any requirement 
in that regard. 
 




For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Larsen's 
complaint alleges violations of clearly established rights 
under the Impairment of Contracts Clause, the Due Process 
Clause, and the First Amendment. Therefore, appellants are 
not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to those 
claims and, accordingly, we will affirm the district court's 
denial of their motion to dismiss those claims on qualified 
immunity grounds. However, Larsen's complaint fails to 
allege violations of his rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Public Health Services Act. We therefore will 
reverse the denial of appellants' motion to dismiss those 
claims and on remand the district court should dismiss 
those claims on qualified immunity grounds. In summary, 
we will affirm in part, will reverse in part, and will remand 
this case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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